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Abstract:  The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective 
experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show 
responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation 
of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources 
that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These 
observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.  
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Subjective experiences are “a basic awareness of the world without further reflection on that 
awareness” (Klein & Barron (2016)) (K&B).  In vertebrates this ability is implemented by 
subcortical structures. K & B make a convincing case that structures with similar functions 
are also present in the much smaller brains of insects. Such structures are not present in 
jellyfish or nematode worms, and a case is made that these taxa do not have a basic 
awareness. They appear to act with little or no centralized decision-making ability. Unable to 
relate to specific environmental locations, they do not perform spatiotemporal modelling 
and thus their search is random. A key ability of many mobile animals is not just to detect 
environmental changes but to distinguish between real changes and those brought about by 
the animal’s own movement. Insects and vertebrates both have this ability. The structures 
that underlie this integration have a long evolutionary history. They presumably predate the 
split between arthropods and chordates because of the similarities in the different 
arthropod groups (e.g., insects, crustaceans and spiders). According to K & B, both phyla 
“have a perspective on the world with a unique phenomenological feel.” That is, insects (as 
well as other arthropods) have feelings too. 
 
K & B derive these conclusions from a detailed comparison of the complex brain structures 
and functions of arthropods (insects) and vertebrates. Their impressive review gives insight 
into what are presumed to be the relative abilities of the two phyla. I say “presumed” 
because of the accepted difficulty of studying feelings in animals (Stamp Dawkins 2012.) I 
attempt nevertheless to evaluate what K & B’s view entails for the perception of potential 
tissue damage and whether that might involve the feeling that we call pain.  
 
Although K & B’s target article itself does not mention it explicitly, questions about pain have 
already been raised in several of the subsequent commentaries (e.g., Adamo 2016b, Fischer 
2016, Lamey 2016, Tye 2016). The possibility of pain in insects is also the topic of a recent 
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paper by one of the commentators (Adamo 2016a). I will try to assess what we can conclude 
from this work. My own experience is with decapod crustaceans rather than insects. I use 
experimental approaches to test whether their responses to noxious stimuli are consistent 
with the idea that they are feeling pain (e.g., Elwood & Appel 2009, Barr et al. 2008, Magee 
& Elwood 2013, 2016a,b). 
 
A key problem with studying pain in animals is that they might have purely reflexive 
nociceptive responses without the associated feeling of pain (Elwood 2011, Sneddon et al. 
2014). Nematodes, for example, do have the ability to detect noxious stimuli and respond by 
moving away (Whittenburg & Baumeister 1999). K & B do not infer from this that feelings 
occur in this group. This nociceptive ability nevertheless provides protection from the 
damaging effects of those noxious stimuli. One may wonder what advantage is gained by the 
ability to feel pain. The most persuasive hypothesis is that pain would enhance the salience 
of the stimulus that caused it and enable the animal to learn to rapidly avoid that stimulus 
(Sneddon et al. 2014). Thus the benefit would arise from reducing the reoccurrence of tissue 
damage. In contrast, with nociception alone, lacking awareness of the stimulus, rapid 
avoidance learning would be less likely. The negative affective state of pain is accordingly 
predicted to include awareness, which provides the strong motivation to escape the stimulus 
in the short term and to avoid it in the future. Where there is sentience we would expect to 
see avoidance and discrimination learning if the animal is repeatedly exposed to noxious 
stimuli. This is indeed found in various insects (Agarwal 2011) and decapods (Magee & 
Elwood 2013), but only if the stimuli to be discriminated are presented simultaneously and 
not sequentially (Magee & Elwood 2016a). Electric shock also changes risk-taking behaviour 
in crayfish in ways similar to anxiety in vertebrates. Treatment with anxiolytic drugs made for 
human use also reduces such anxiety in crayfish (Fossat et al. 2014, 2015). Subjective 
experience thus provides long-term protection. 
 
Attention to particular stimuli can also be inferred when an animal rubs or grooms the part 
of the body to which the noxious stimulus was applied. In prawns we see prolonged 
grooming and rubbing of a specific antenna that was subject to noxious chemical application 
(Barr et al. 2008). Hermit crabs groom their abdomen if they receive electric shock there 
(Appel & Elwood 2009a,b) and brown crabs that have had a claw pulled off, as in commercial 
fishery practice, pick at their wound (Claire McCambridge, personal communication). These 
arthropods appear to know the location of the noxious stimulus and direct their behaviour to 
that location, suggesting that they are attending to the feeling of the wound. These activities 
are consistent with the idea of arthropods having a subjective experience. 
 
K & B also consider subjective experience to be an aid in decision-making processes. Finely 
tuned decisions that weigh and trade off different motivations can be observed in decapods 
in response to noxious stimuli. Hermit crabs housed in poor quality shells are more likely to 
abandon them when they receive shock on the abdomen than crabs living in high quality 
shells (Elwood & Appel 2009). Hermit crabs are also less likely to abandon a shell if shocked 
when there are odours of predators in the water (compared to when there is no odour or 
only the odour of non-predators) (Magee & Elwood 2016b). Thus, in both cases the crabs are 
not acting by pure reflex; rather, a decision-making process is evident that is consistent with 
the idea of a subjective experience.  
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When hermit crabs gather and use information about empty shells for potential occupancy, 
the information is drawn from multiple sources over time (reviewed by Elwood 1995). 
Information about shell species and hence shape is gathered during the approach to the 
shell. This is followed by a series of activities during which the crab palpates the exterior of 
the shell, gaining information about shape and size. The crab then repeatedly inserts its 
chelipeds into the shell aperture and gathers information about obstructions such as sand 
within the shell. If sand is detected, the crab turns the shell to pour it out but larger particles 
are lifted out with the chelipeds. The chelped exploration within the shell gathers further 
information about size and shape. Depending on the suitability of the shell for that individual 
compared to its current shell, the crab may or may not move into the new shell. If it moves 
in, it moves about within the shell and may then go through a series of activities apparently 
assessing its original shell with its chelipeds. Eventually a decision is made as to which shell 
will be occupied. Hence the crab appears to attend to and integrate information from 
different sources to make this complex decision. It is difficult to imagine how this could be 
achieved without some form of subjective experience (but see critique by Mallatt & Feinberg 
2016).  
 
K & B note briefly that robots that have hitherto been assumed to lack subjective experience 
can nevertheless act in ways similar to insects. This robot analogy has been specifically used 
to discount the possibility of pain experience in insects (Adamo 2016a). Robots can certainly 
be designed to exhibit pain-like behaviour. For example, in the training of dental students 
robotic models of the human head have been programmed to behave like humans in pain 
during dental treatment. Clearly these robots do not feel pain yet nevertheless react to 
clumsy treatment by prospective dentists as if they did. If robots can be programmed in this 
way to appear as if they feel pain then – so the argument by analogy goes – insects too may 
have simple systems to respond to noxious stimuli without the subjective experience. There 
is a major flaw in this argument, however: Robots result from intelligent design in which 
highly skilled engineers produce a system that mimics humans in pain. By contrast, insects 
result from natural selection; thus their behaviour should have benefits in terms of fitness 
that outweigh the costs. I cannot imagine what benefits insects or other arthropods might 
gain from behaving as if they were in pain if they were not actually having a subjective 
experience. Indeed, given the long time since the divergence of arthropods from the lines 
that gave rise to vertebrates, one must assume that they mimicked something that did not 
exist for hundreds of million years. 
 
Pain is often dismissed in most invertebrates on the grounds that their brains are too small 
and simple (Elwood 2011). K & B’s work suggests that this dismissal should not be accepted 
so readily. They argue instead that the nervous system of insects and other arthropods is 
complex and has functions similar to those of vertebrates with respect to subjective 
experience. They specify those taxonomic groups in which pain might be expected to occur 
and those in which it would not. In this K & B have done a good job. Of course, none of these 
studies proves that arthropods feel pain. My own conclusion is that it is indeed possible that 
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